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来自新加坡国立大学的Gongtao Chen助理教授到我院做Distribution Channel Structure for Competing Supply Chains with Price and Lead-Time Sensitive Demand的学术报告

2012年09月17日 00:00
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各位老师和硕博同学:

新学期开始了,欢迎大家踊跃参加学术报告活动。这学期第一个报告信息如下。

题目:面临价格和交货时间敏感的需求时的连锁竞争的分销渠道结构

报告人:Lucy Gongtao Chen,assistant professor in Operations Management at NUS Business School, National University of Singapore

时间:9月18日周二下午2:30-4:00

地点:伟伦楼 336

Title: Distribution Channel Structure for Competing Supply Chains with Price and Lead-Time Sensitive Demand

Speaker: Lucy Gongtao Chen,assistant professor in Operations Management at NUS Business School, National University of Singapore

Time:Sep. 18th,2:30-4:00pm

Location:Weilun 336

Abstract:

This paper studies distribution channel structure strategies (to centralize or decentralize) for

two competing supply chains that sell substitutable products with price and lead-time sensitive

demand. We find that centralization (decentralization) associates with itself a price (lead- time)

advantage and a lead-time (price) disadvantage. As a result, price substitution and lead-time

substitution have different impact on the equilibrium channel structure. Specifically, price

substitution favors decentralization whereas lead-time substitution tends to result in

centralization. Our results show that the equilibrium channel structure may critically depend on

the game type (Bertrand vs. Cournot) and the profit criterion (manufacturer profit vs. channel

profit). In the Cournot model, centralization for both chains (CC) is always the only Nash

equilibrium. In the Bertrand model, CC is still the only Nash equilibrium for the manufacturer

profit criterion. On the channel profit criterion, however, it is the relative intensity of price and

lead-time substitution that determines the equilibrium channel structure.